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The Volatility of the ‘Other’:




1 The construction of inimical figures lies at the heart of identity formation processes. This
postulate can bring together political scientists and anthropologists alike. The former will
discern here the friend/foe dialectics in which nationalism originates (Jaffrelot 2003). The
latter will interpret this process in terms of ethnic boundaries formation (Barth 1969).
Whatever concept social scientists may use to refer to this construction of the ‘other’,
they all agree on its crucial role in the formation of ‘ethnic groups’, this term referring to
‘all the groups of a society characterized by a distinct sense of difference owing to culture
and descent’  (Glazer  & Moynihan 1975:  4).  Therefore,  ‘From its  beginning,  the  term
ethnicity has been one concerned with opposition, on the nature of difference between
antagonistic  groups’  (MacClancy  1996:  9).  Yet,  the  specificities  of  ethnic  relations  in
diasporic environments remain understudied and social scientists are still too inclined to
relate  diasporic  communities  to  a  single  ‘other’:  their  host  state  and  society.  This
analytical  myopia  leads  to  an  obliteration  of  all  the  other  ‘others’  of  migrant
communities,1 whether  in  their  country  of  residence  or  in  their  home  state.  The
deterritorialization of such communities and their transnational—or rather translocal—
networks put them into actual or virtual contact with a wide range of actors, amongst
whom several may be eligible for the title of ‘other’. Thus, enlarging the spectrum of
analysis has become urgent for social scientists concerned with diasporas, their identities
and their mobilizations. It is to that heuristic leap forward that I would like to contribute
here, through a theoretical discussion based on my fieldwork in the UK (Gayer 1998). 
2 Constructions of the ‘other’, in diasporic environments, have two major attributes: their
multiplicity and their volatility. Ethnic entrepreneurs have a wide range of options to
propose an ‘enemy’ to their audience, hence their multiplicity. At the same time, social
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and political evolutions in the migrants’ country of residence or in their home state make
such  constructions  of  otherness  highly  contingent.  The  study  of  ethnic  relations  in
diasporic  environments  is  thus  a  difficult  task  and  very  little  empirical  material  is
presently  available  on  this  critical  issue.  But  before  looking  at  social  and  political
relations between ‘diasporic communities’, it is necessary to define this elusive notion
which social scientists have become accustomed to use in a rather loose way. 
 
Defining diasporas
3 Among the Jews, the Hebrew term ‘galout’ (exile) evokes the nostalgia of origins, whereas
the Greek term ‘diaspora’ is related to a specific and critical event: the dispersion of the
Jewish community after the destruction of the Temple of Jerusalem and the annexation of
Judea  by  the  Romans.  Even  if  the  term  ‘diaspora’  appeared  for  the  first  time  in
Thucydides’ War of the Peloponnesus to describe the scattered Greeks (Sheffer 2003: 9), it
has remained associated with the Jews until the 16th century. In French, this singularity of
the Jewish condition was emphasized by the spelling of the term, which started with a
capital letter. However, between the 17th century and the 1960s, this term has become
more banal and it was progressively attributed to the Greeks, the Armenians and the
Chinese.  Throughout  this  period,  the  term  ‘diaspora’  designated  ‘the  condition  of
geographically dispersed people, who were mobilized by different political organizations
and who, in spite of their dispersion, retained a form of unity and solidarity’ (Schnapper
2001: 9). But since the end of the 1960s, the semantic field of the term has widened and it
has been applied to every group of dispersed people, from expatriates to refugees and
from immigrants to activists in exile. This indiscriminate use of the term is particularly
pronounced since the 1980s and may be explained by the crisis of assimilation policies
and the subsequent rise of the politics of diversity in western host states (Shuval 2003).
This semantic confusion, which originates from new perceptions of migrant ethnicities,
has made the use of the term highly problematic, because it now refers to extremely
diverse processes and because it is often used in a metaphorical way (Marienstras 1989,
Safran 1991, Skinner 1993). The historicity of the diasporic condition has also blurred: by
looking at diasporas in the longue-durée, geographers and sociologists often fall prey to
what Stéphane Dufoix has called a ‘fixing illusion’, which postulates ‘the a-historicity, the
permanence of transnational communities through the ages (…) without fundamental
changes  in  their  modes  of  organization,  as  if  their  existence  was  somehow natural’
(Dufoix 1999: 151). 
4 The term ‘diaspora’ now implicitly postulates the existence of intangible links between
dispersed people and their homeland, although such links, which have to be constructed
and nurtured,  take a variety of  forms in time and space.  This dynamic dimension of
diasporic identifications had been emphasized by early pioneers of diasporic studies, such
as  Gabriel  Sheffer  (1986).  However,  analysts  of  diasporas  now  tend  to  neglect  this
dynamics, by taking the existence of Armenian, Chinese or Indian diasporas for granted.
Social  links between these diasporas and their  homelands thus become reified,  since
every emigrant or political exile is supposed to belong to the diaspora. At the same time,
the  identifications  of  these  dispersed  peoples  become  a-historical,  since  diasporic
consciousness seems to be unchanging. 
5 To break away from such reifications,  diasporic studies have to acknowledge present
changes in the circulation of people, ideas and funds while questioning the historical
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trajectories of these evolutions. Beyond this quest for historicity, diasporic studies must
rely  on  solid  definitions  of  the  term  ‘diaspora’  itself.  Political  sociology  and  social
anthropology can both help us to ground this definition in solid theoretical premises.
Informed  by  historians,  political  sociologists  have  shown  us  that  traditions  are
modernized, sometimes even invented. Social anthropologists, for their part, have taught
us to look at culture as a process rather than a substance. By trying to bridge the gaps
between these two disciplines which have engaged in a fruitful dialogue in the last decade
or so, I will here define diasporas through their patterns of formation, interaction and
mobilization, i.e. through their identity politics rather than through their morphological
properties.  I  tend  to  see  diasporas  as  translocal  social  groups  which,  under  certain
circumstances, fashion a common identity for their members, distinct from that of their
host and home societies. This distinct identity is based on memories of a temporally and
geographically distant past which are reconstructed to suit the needs of the present. In
other  words,  diasporas  are  self  conscious  and  politically  organized  mnemonic
communities. Their members are brought together by shared memories of their (even
mythical)  homeland and they ground their  lives  in a translocal  space which may be
partially virtual. Like every other social group, diasporas also ground their identities in
constructions  of  otherness,  both  internal  (fixing  the  boundary  between ‘proper’  and
‘incorrect’  behaviours  inside  the  community)  and  external  (fixing  the  boundaries
between the community and its social  partners).  These translocal  populations have a
wider range of options than more territorialized communities in this regard. Moreover,
as I have already suggested, diasporic constructions of otherness present a high volatility
due to the plurality of factors affecting them, in the translocal space where they evolve. 
6 To avoid the reifications which are all too often associated with conceptualizations ‘from
above’, I will look at Indian and Pakistani diasporas ‘from below’, through everyday lives
of Indian and Pakistan migrants in the UK, particularly in the West London area where I
have done most of my fieldwork related to overseas Indians and Pakistanis. This urban
space is not a ‘locality’ in the traditional sense but one place of experience among others
for the populations which inhabit it. To comprehend such a translocal space, I travelled to
various locales, from Indian Punjab to British Columbia. My experience of fieldwork was
therefore multi-local  and trans-local,  in that I  tried to clarify the nature of relations
between several political localities.2 
 
Volatile identities: constructions of otherness among
overseas Indians and Pakistanis in Southall, UK
7 South Asian migrants have not been immune to the popularization of the term ‘diaspora’
during  the  last  two  decades.  The  renewed  interest  of  Indian  authorities  for  their
expatriates  and  their  growing  political  clout,  particularly  in  the  US,  have  recently
contributed  to  a  proliferation  of  publications  on  the  Indian  diaspora  (Jayaram 2004,
Parekh et al. 2003). Some authors prefer to talk of a ‘South Asian diaspora’, even if they
rarely precise what they mean by that, making this phrase synonymous with ‘South Asian
overseas’  (Vertovec  1991).  If  some  authors  inscribe  the  Indian  diaspora  in  a  larger
diasporic formation, others undermine these theoretical constructions by talking of a
Hindu  (Vertovec  2000)  or  a  Sikh  diaspora  (Barrier  &  Dusenbery  1989,  Tatla  1999).
Surprisingly, Pakistani migrants have not received the same attention from analysts of
diasporas and only a handful of anthropologists have studied the Pakistani diaspora.3
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8 If I stick to the definition of the term ‘diaspora’ I proposed above, overseas South Asians
are  clearly  not  eligible  for  this  title.  Overseas  Sri-Lankans  and  overseas  Indians,
Pakistanis  and  Bangladeshis  do  not  share  a  homeland,  nor  do  they  have  common
memories. Moreover, these migrants do not circulate in the same translocal space. On the
contrary, the new politics of identity of some Indian overseas communities, particularly
in the US, and the renewed interest of the Indian state for its prodigal son have now
turned the Indian diaspora into a socio-political reality. The same cannot be said of the
Pakistani  diaspora,  which is  yet to turn into an established social  fact.  However,  the
specific  identifications,  modes  of  socialization  and  political  orientations  of  overseas
Pakistanis and the emergence of a new blend of explicitly Pakistani ethnic entrepreneurs
during the last decade or so justify the use of the term. I will therefore refer to Indian and
Pakistani diasporas throughout this paper, even if I believe that the term can also be
applied  to  the  Sikhs  and to  the  Kashmiris  living  abroad,  at  least  since  the  last  two
decades, during which these minorities in the larger Indian and Pakistani diasporas have
developed singular identities and patterns of  organization in relation to the political
turmoil  affecting their  homeland.  The transformation of  overseas  Sikh and Kashmiri
communities into diasporas illustrates vividly the volatility of constructions of otherness
among  overseas  South  Asians.  Political  turmoil  in  the  homeland  or  socio-economic
conflicts in the country of residence may trigger conflicts between these diasporas; they
may also create dissensions within their ranks, by fuelling fissiparous tendencies. 
9 These communal tensions can vary greatly from one country to another. Although it is
often assumed that identities of South Asian migrant communities are largely ‘brought
with them’, and that they are ‘based upon primordial and age-old forms of identity to be
found in  the  Indian  subcontinent’,  the  conflicts  between these  communities  are  not
inevitable  or  natural.  Indeed,  as  Crispin  Bates  (2001:  3)  suggests,  ‘the  boundaries  of
‘communities’ and their relations with neighbours of other communities, and the political
articulation of these relationships, can vary enormously’. Divergent social and historical
circumstances  have  produced  different  patterns  of  community  relations  in  every
settlement of overseas South Asians. Such divergences are manifest at the national level
but also at the local, neighbourhood level.
10 To illustrate this volatility of the ‘other’ in the Indian and Pakistani diasporas, I have
chosen to focus my analysis on a neighborhood of west London: Southall,  the ‘capital
town of South Asians in Britain’ (Baumann 1998: 38). In the 1920s, this industrial suburb
was populated by English and Irish labourers. In the 1950s, this workforce was replaced
by Indian and Pakistani emigrants, largely of Punjabi origin. The presence of industrial
plants in the area and the proximity of Heathrow Airport provided these migrants with
numerous job opportunities and most of them expected to return to their homeland after
a few years. Reforms in British laws regulating immigration put an end to this myth of
return and led these early migrants to bring their families with them. During the 1970s,
the presence of South Asians in the area became even more visible with the arrival of
Indian refugees from Kenya (after 1967) and Uganda (1972). 
11 The  contiguity  of  Indian  and  Pakistani  migrant  ‘communities’  in  the neighbourhood
makes  Southall  a  place  of  special  interest  for  studying  the  relations  between  these
diasporic populations. The ethnic diversity of Southall is exemplified by table 1, which
shows ‘Indians’ in a hegemonic position and ‘Pakistanis’ in that of a minority. Among the
‘Indians’,  Hindus  are  a  minority:  the  proportion  of  Sikhs  in  the  local  South  Asian
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population varies from 40% across the town as a whole to 60% in the central  wards
(Baumann 1998: 73). 
 





‘White’ 30 (of whom one in ten was born in Ireland)
‘Black Caribbean’ 5
Other categories 5
Source: Baumann 1998: 48
 
The ties that bind: Southallian attempts at
transcending national and religious cleavages 
12 At  first  sight,  social  harmony  seems  to  prevail  in  multi-religious  Southall.  As  Gerd
Baumann (1998: 46) suggests, ‘Stereotyping and sometimes disdain of neighbours from
different communities is by no means rare. Yet there is the strictest censure on declared
or open enmity. The make-up of the population is varied enough for everyone, on the
surface at least, to pretend to ‘get on well with everyone’. The public tone is polite’. 
13 When South Asian migrants started settling down in Southall,  this  idyllic  portrait  of
community relations was not very far from the truth, even if such representations of the
neighbourly relations between South Asian immigrants should be treated as a political
and normative discourse which depicts the way these populations should live together
rather than their actual neighbourly relations. Such discourses should be taken seriously,
though. However normative they may be, these representations are performative: they
change the world they claim to represent. And however utopian they may seem to be,
these performative declarations are grounded into a certain reality,  which should be
questioned rather than rejected altogether. 
14 In the 1950s and 1960s Indians and Pakistanis did not have any hostility for each other
and the memories of Partition did not prevent them from joining the same associations,
such  as  the  Indo-Pakistan  Cultural  Society.  Trade  unionism was  also  a  strong  bind.
Although  the  hegemonic  local  trade-union  was  the  communist-dominated  Indian
Workers’ Association (IWA, founded in 1956), it accepted Pakistanis as associate members.
Beyond trade-unionism, anti-racism also brought Southallians together throughout the
1960s and 1970s, which saw the rise of the British National Party (BNP) in local councils.
During  this  period,  Southall  experienced  several  disturbances  that  the  local  media
presented as ‘race riots’. The worst of these incidents took place on 23 April 1979, when a
demonstration of  the National  Front led to clashes between skin-heads and left-wing
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activists which resulted in the death of Neo-Zealander teacher named Blair Peach. Left
politics was then building bridges between South Asians of all caste and creed. But this
rapprochement was also based on a shared popular culture, which has been reinvented in
the diasporic context. 
15 Most South Asian inhabitants of Southall originate from the Punjab and share the same
language. Beyond language, Punjabis of all caste and creed share a common imagination,
based on folk tales, poetry and songs. This popular culture fashions common attitudes,
assumptions and practices, so that wherever they reside, ‘Punjabis willingly, and indeed
proudly,  identify themselves as  such,  regardless of whether they might otherwise be
classified  as  Hindus,  Muslims  or  Sikhs,  and  regardless  of  whether  they  hold  Indian,
Pakistani, British, United States, Canadian or any passport’ (Ballard 1999: 12). Yet, Punjabi
identity (Panjabiyat) has been undermined by the communal reconstruction of religious
communities  in  the  Punjab  during  the  19th and  20 th century  and  even  more  so  by
Partition, to such an extent that historian J.S. Grewal (1999: 52) has suggested that ‘the
shattered mirror of Punjabi consciousness reflects tiny images, which refuse to coalesce
into a portrait’. In the diaspora, the events of the last decades have also contributed to
the  weakening  of  pan-Punjabi  identifications.  During  the  1950s  and  1960s,  Punjabi
immigrants found some comfort in the proximity of other Punjabis, regardless of their
caste and creed: ‘family connections, or affiliations of region, language, dress, and culture
proved to be a comfort in a still deeply stratified and discriminatory London’ (Shukla
2005: 92). However, in the following decades, these supranational linkages became less
appealing to ‘Indian’ and ‘Pakistani’ Punjabis. Paradoxically, while they started taking
roots in an increasingly multicultural London, these populations were also ‘reclaimed’ by
their national homelands, to use the words of one of my (Sikh) informers. This is not to
say that they were naturally inclined to ‘go back to their roots’,  but rather that they
started feeling confident enough in their new diasporic environment to reconstruct their
identity by emphasizing their differences, both inwardly (in order to set themselves apart
from other ‘Indians’ and ‘Pakistanis’) and outwardly (in order to dissociate themselves
from other, less successful, ethnic minorities but also to publicize their difference from
an ‘English’ society which was still resenting the presence of its former colonial subjects
in the backyard of the metropolis). 
16 It is in this context that political turmoil in the homeland came to affect patterns of
community  relations  in  the  diaspora,  external  changes  being  mediated  by  the
transformations of the local context. Therefore, armed conflict in the Indian Punjab did
not  impulse  the communalization of  overseas  Sikhs  but  only accelerated an ongoing
process of differentiation between Punjabi Sikhs and Hindus, whose interactions became
less  frequent  after  operation  Bluestar  and  the  anti-Sikh  pogroms  of  1984.  This
estrangement  of  Hindu  and  Sikh  populations  tends  to  be  undermined  by  Hindu
Southallians, who often denounce the brutality of Operation Bluestar and emphasize the
shared culture of all Punjabis in order to bring the Sikhs back into the Indian fold. This
(re-)integrative discourse is reminiscent of the attempts made by Hindu nationalists to
reclaim the Sikhs as Hindus. However, in multireligious Southall, this discourse does not
derive from a project of assimilation by the Hindu majority but, rather, from an attempt
to preserve communal harmony and to defend the ‘common world’ bringing together
each  and  every  Southallian  of  Punjabi  descent.  One  of  my  informers,  working  as  a
journalist for the local Desh Pardesh (whose editor was murdered by the Khalistanis) thus
told me: ‘The attack on the Golden Temple was a very painful event that History can’t
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forget or forgive. It was a historical blunder. Even Hindus feel the same. No religious
place should be attacked by the army. But Hindus and Sikhs are the same, they are still
closely related. The moderate Sikhs and Hindus realize that this was a mistake and that it
shouldn’t be kept in the minds, otherwise it will vice the atmosphere’.4
17 The end of militancy in the Indian Punjab has opened a new political space for Punjabi
nationalists in the diaspora and some Khalistani cadres of the preceding decades have
dropped the Khalistan issue to promote ‘Panjabiyat’. This is particularly true of the Sikh
nationalists who mobilized the Khalistan Council around Jagjit Singh Chauhan, the main
ideologue of  the Khalistan movement,  who settled in Britain at  the beginning of  the
1970s. Although Chauhan himself returned to India in 2001, his aides did not disengage
from politics and they have recently set-up a lobby called ‘Punjabis in Britain’, patronized
by the Labour M.P.  for Hayes and Harlington,  John McDonnell.5 One of  these former
Khalistanis has also launched an NGO, the Panjabi Center, which addresses Punjabis of all
caste and creed. It remains to be seen if such initiatives can appeal to Punjabi Hindus and
Muslims,  who tend to see Punjabi  nationalism as  a  Trojan Horse taking forward the
agenda of Sikh nationalists. In any case, the reinvention of former Khalistanis as Punjabi
nationalists attests of the volatility of community relations in Southall and reveals the
superposition  of  identifications  which  characterize  its  inhabitants,  who  do  share  a
Punjabi identity but who have seen it undermined by communal conflicts in India, by the
Indo-Pakistani  inter-state rivalry and by periodic episodes of  tension in the diaspora
itself. 
18 Cultural and political identifications of South Asian Southallians are highly complex and
volatile, which makes the characterization of community relations in the area a rather
difficult  task.  One  group,  in  particular,  presents  extremely  ambivalent  tendencies
regarding  the  modes  of  identification  and  mobilization  of its  members:  the  second
generation. Contradictory trends have emerged among these youths during the last two
decades. Amongst the most privileged sections of this age-group, particularly those with
a  university  degree,  a  pan-ethnic  movement  promoting  the  redefinition  of  Indians,
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis as ‘Asians’ has met with some success. However, as in the
U.S., this pan-ethnicity has been opposed by communal elements, who have also taken
roots amongst the youth. In Southall, some of these communal elements turned violent,
mixing  gang  culture  with  religion  to  assert  their  violent  masculinities.  The  political
divide between the youths of the second generation is not only class-based, though. Even
if the members of the ‘gangs’ of west and northwest London were generally unemployed
and  came  from  the  most  underprivileged  strata  of  the  ‘Asian’  community,  Islamist
associations (such as the Jama’at-i Islami, known in Britain as the Islamic Foundation) and
their Hindu and Sikh counterparts tend to recruit their members in the upper strata of
this population, particularly in universities. Although this was for very different motives,
communalism has therefore appealed to the youths at the two extremes of the social
ladder,  whereas the pan-ethnic ‘Asian’ movement has primarily found support in the
most privileged sections of the second generation. Yet, if the most privileged sections of
the second generation have been the backbone of the ‘Asian’ socio-political movement, in
a rather abstract and literary way, it is in mixed working-class suburbs such as Southall
that  the  ‘Asian’  culture  is  lived  and  consumed  with  the  greatest  intensity,  through
cinema, music, food and sports.
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The diasporic reinvention of communalism: ‘religious’
conflicts in Southall
19 If Southallians, like other inhabitants of South Asian ethnic enclaves in the UK and North
America,6 share a common popular culture transcending ethnic and religious boundaries,
they are not immune to communal tensions. As in the subcontinent, communal conflicts
are both punctual and selective in their appeal: they are activated by symbolic events and
only mobilize a  small  number of  actors,  mainly suburban unemployed young males.7
These communal tensions are at their highest during religious festivals (Diwali for the
Hindus, Baisakhi for the Sikhs and Eid for the Muslims) but also during cricket matches
between India and Pakistan. However, as the case of cricket vividly illustrates, religious
and sportive events are irreducible to politics, or rather, they are prone to multiple and
conflictive political interpretations. As we shall see now, cricket is not inherently a factor
of communal tensions between overseas Indians and Pakistanis. If the game has been
appropriated by young chauvinistic street fighters, it has also been a source of inspiration
for pan-ethnic peace-builders. And although youth ‘gangs’ disrupted communal relations
by investing cricket  with war-like attributes,  they also bridged ethnic  boundaries  by
playing the same game as their ‘other’, having fun in antagonizing him.
20 As Ashis Nandy (2000: xvi) suggests, ‘cricket is a religion in South Asia’. So much so that a
well-known humorist once noted about the Indians that ‘For six months in a year they
watch cricket and for the next six, they talk about it’ (Krishna 1982). The game arouses
the same passions among South Asians living abroad. However, the stakes are higher in
the  ‘diaspora’,  since  every  important  match  between  South  Asian  nations  has  the
potential to trigger conflicts between local South Asian communities. Indeed, if the Shiv
Sena tried to prevent the Pakistani Team from visiting India in 1999—by threatening the
Pakistani players, among other things, to infiltrate cobras in their hotel rooms (Khan
2005: 24)—violent incidents are rather rare during cricket matches in South Asia.8 On the
contrary, in the diaspora, the contiguity of Indian and Pakistani communities leads to
frequent  clashes,  particularly  between local  youth ‘gangs’.  For  these  urban depraved
youths,  cricket  has lost  its  gentlemanly connection and has become a more plebeian
game, through which they may express their long-distance nationalism and their social
frustrations,  while  defending  or  extending  their  ‘territory’  and the  various  unlawful
activities  which  they  may  control  inside  it.  For  these  playful  and  aggrieved  youths,
cricket has become a new bodily language, infused with politics of identity and economic
rationalities. In the words of anthropologist Pnina Werbner (1996: 94-5), it has become ‘an
expression  of  controlled  masculine  aggression  and  competitiveness’  and  a  popular
expression of modern nationalism. 
21 The  ‘communal’  incidents  that  regularly  disturb  Southall  during  important  matches
between Indian and Pakistani teams epitomize this manly but not so gentle reinvention of
cricket. Like in every other South Asian suburb in the UK, these matches are accompanied
by public performances, with (mostly male) youngsters waving flags and hooting their
horns to make their presence felt in the neighbourhood and to provoke their adversaries.
These demonstrations may turn violent when the demonstrators cross ‘hostile territories’
or  run into  a  group of  opponents.  Anticipating trouble,  shopkeepers  often prefer  to
remain closed on the days of important cricket matches. Although these demonstrations
are reminiscent of  the peripatetic  provocations of  Indian communal  rioters (Jaffrelot
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1992), they are actually less informed by the ‘model’ of the Indian communal riot than by
the local practice of ‘cruising’. This practice, which implies driving at a snail’s pace in
congested streets with loud speakers blasting fancy tunes,  was invented by American
teenagers  and popularized  worldwide  by  George  Lucas’  American  Graffiti.  In  Southall,
cruising remained a popular activity amongst the local youth at the time of my fieldwork,
neo-Bhangra competing with Gangsta Rap in CD-players. These playful exhibitions mostly
took place on the Broadway, Southall’s main artery, which links the suburb with central
London (topographically, the Broadway is an extension of Oxford Street). The peculiar
marketing techniques of its shopkeepers, who do not hesitate to open their stalls on the
sidewalk, are reminiscent of South Asian conventions on the use of urban space and make
the Broadway a cruiser’s paradise, since ‘the satisfaction of the cruiser grows with the
number of heads that are turned and with the whispers that identify one or the other as a
‘big guy’ in one of Southall’s two well-known ‘gangs’’ (Baumann 1998). The provocations
of local  youth ‘gangs’,  during religious festivals and important cricket matches,  were
inspired by these leisurely practices of cruising. The communal incidents which have
taken place in Southall during these symbolic events are therefore irreducible to politics,
the place of fun needing to be acknowledged in these aggressive assertions of a powerful
Self.9 
22 ‘Gang’ may not be the most appropriate term to define the ‘local, mainly disorganized
collective affiliations’  (Bhatt  1997:  269)  which appeared among deprived South Asian
youths from east, west, northwest and southeast London, but also from the Midlands and
the north, during the mid-1980s. Some of these ‘gangs’ were hardly organized and would
only become semi-organized for specific events. In west and northwest London, however,
these violent youth associations had a more permanent basis. Between the mid-1980s and
the mid-1990s, the two main ‘gangs’ of the area were the Holy Smokes (which was mainly
composed of young Sikh males) and the Tooti Nungs (which was mainly composed of
young  Hindu  males  but  which  acquired  some  associates  from  the  local  Caribbean
communities). By the end of the decade, two new ‘gangs’ had emerged in the area: the
Sher-e Punjab, exclusively composed of young Sikhs, and the Chalvey Boys, which was
composed of Muslims. Although the formation of these ‘gangs’ took place along religious
lines, ‘the manifestation of gang activities is far more complex than ethnic or religious
identification allows and refers us to syncretic associations between criminal activities,
surveillance and sexual harassment of women, ‘antiracist’  formations, renunciation of
patriarchal  pedagogy  and  recreation  of  patriarchal  tradition,  as  well  as  explicitly
religious political identification’ (Bhatt 1997: 269). The rivalry between the ‘Asian gangs’
of  west  and  north-west  London  had  indeed  several  components  in  it:  geographical,
communal and criminal. The conflict between the Holy Smokes and the Tooti Nungs was
reminiscent of that between English and Irish labourers settled in Southall during the
1920s: the Holy Smokes came from the ‘Old’ part of Southall, built in the Late Victorian
era, whereas the Tooti Nungs came from the ‘New’ part of the town, which grew between
the  1920s  and  1950s  (Baumann  1998:  38).  Religion  was  also  used  by  these  gangs  to
legitimate  their  violence  against  the  ‘other’,  during  important  cricket  matches  and
religious festivals. In 1997, for instance, 90 people were arrested in Southall for carrying
arms and public disorder. Regrettably, this year, Eid and Diwali had been celebrated the
same day. 
23 For the young racketeers, communal violence was a way to provoke a retaliation which
would make their offer of protection more attractive. But Asian youth ‘gangs’ in Southall
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and Slough also fought for the control of ‘atta’, this Punjabi word for ‘flour’ here referring
to heroin. It is this implication in drug dealing that brought discredit to these ‘gangs’. By
the end of the 1990s, the ‘gangs’ had lost their popularity. Violence did not come to an
end but the ‘gangs’ were unsuccessful in their protection racket: people understood that
their  offer  of  protection had too  high a  cost  and started  seeing  them as  a  menace,
threatening communal relations and discrediting South Asians in the eyes of the British
public. Indeed, during the 1990s, the ‘Asian gang’ was brought by the British media ‘to the
forefront  of  public  concerns  over  crime,  urban  decay,  poverty  and  civil  unrest’
(Alexander 2000: 229). This re-imagination of the ‘Asian’ community as a troublesome lot
greatly upset its elder members, who had been satisfied with previous clichés on their
‘unthreatening, law abiding and unproblematic’ model minority (Alexander 2000: 15). The
medias’ constructions of Southall as a land of gangsters were also detrimental to local
businesses by driving away potential investors. 
24 Women were the most vocal in their opposition to the ‘gangs’, even if a handful of young
females did join them to get away from oppressive indoor and poverty-stricken lives.
During my fieldwork, women were my only interlocutors to mention the existence of
communal  tensions  in  Southall.  And  although  some  of  my  female  interviewees  saw
communal tensions as a natural fact of life, whether in the subcontinent or abroad, most
of them made ‘the gangs’ responsible for the deterioration of community relations in the
neighbourhood. This critique of gang warfare can be explained by the symbolic violence
of  gang  members  towards  women  of  their  own  community.  As  James  Clifford  has
suggested, ‘Life for women in diasporic situations can be doubly painful – struggling with
the material and spiritual insecurities of exile, with the demands of family and work, and
with the demands of old and new patriarchies’ (Clifford 1997: 259). This is precisely what
made  the  life  of  so  many  female  Southallians  a  permanent  hardship  and  it  helps  to
explain  why  they  rejected  the  ‘protection’  that  the  gangs  offered  to  their  ‘sisters’.
Through this ‘protection’, gang members were in fact trying to impose a new moral order
to these women, who were becoming more emancipated through their work10 and/or
through their contacts with British society.  The neo-patriarchal project of  the gangs,
which was enunciated in the politically and culturally correct idiom of ‘protection’ and
‘honour’, was clearly detrimental to women’s interests, as local feminists have suggested
(Patel 1990). Yet, it was apparently supported by traditional elites. Religious authorities,
in particular, implicitly supported the ‘gangs’, in which they found a natural ally in their
own moralization project (Bhatt 1997: 269). 
25 If  cricket  has  been  appropriated  by  the  ‘gangs’  of  west  and  northwest  London,  its
communalization was never complete and the game has also inspired diasporic peace-
builders. Before India and Pakistan developed their ‘cricket diplomacy’ at the end of the
1990s11, a few British ‘Asians’ thought of using cricket as a ‘confidence building measure’
between Indians,  Pakistanis,  Bangladeshis  and Sri-Lankans residing in Britain.  In  the
second half of the 1990s, for instance, the owner of the cash and carry network ‘Bestway’
financed  cricket  teams  which  recruited  their  players  among Bestway’s  employees  of
Indian,  Pakistani  and Bangladeshi  origin.  The recent  attempts at  pacifying cricket  in
South Asia might inspire more initiatives of this kind in the future and the game could
thus  become  a  ‘bridge  of  peace’  in  the  diaspora.  In  any  case,  these  conflictive
interpretations of the game remind us that ‘a sport is an embodied practice in which
meanings  are  generated,  and  whose  representation  and  interpretation  are  open  to
negotiation and contest’ (MacClancy 1996: 4).
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 External events and local divisions: the implosion of
the Indian diaspora in Southall
26 If  the boundaries between South Asian communities settled in Britain are constantly
renegotiated,  particularly  amongst  the youth of  the second generation,  their  internal
boundaries are also regularly questioned. In Southall, these fissiparous tendencies were
vividly illustrated by the formation of a ‘Sikh diaspora’ during the 1980s, which detached
itself from the larger’ Indian diaspora’ after the events of 1984. Until these critical events,
the handful of Sikh nationalists exiled in Britain had not received much attention from
the Sikh public at large. However, political upheavals in the Punjab provided overseas
Khalistanis  with a  golden opportunity  to  mobilize  their  ethnic  brethren.  Indeed,  the
attack on the Golden Temple and the anti-Sikh pogroms of 1984 produced a ‘moral shock’
(Jasper & Poulsen 1995: 498-9) among overseas Sikhs, by brutally upsetting their political
attitudes  and  leading  them  to  mobilize  themselves  in  favour  of  their  rediscovered
homeland.
27 The demand for the creation of a Sikh state in India was first formulated in the 1940s, as a
response to the Pakistan movement (Riar 1999). In the Punjab as in the diaspora, this
demand was  revived  after  operation  Bluestar.  It  was  then brandished as  a  symbolic
weapon defying the Indian state but was also used to comfort a traumatized community.
At a more political level, the demand for Khalistan helped the recently settled migrants to
gain  a  political  clout  in  their  community,  their  transnational  nationalist  protest
promoting  them  to  the  rank  of  local  ‘community  leaders’.  This  success  was  only
temporary,  though.  From  the  beginning,  the  Khalistan  movement  suffered  from
fissiparous  tendencies.  In  India,  Khalistani  armed  groups  failed  to  coordinate  their
actions through the Panthic Committee, which suffered from internecine strife between
the self-proclaimed guerilla commanders. Abroad, a myriad of organizations competed
for the support of the Sikh diaspora and for its representation on the international scene.
In Britain, for instance, five organizations claimed the status of sole representative of the
panth: the Khalistan Council (founded in 1980 in Punjab but led from London by Dr. Jagjit
Singh Chauhan); the Dal Khalsa (founded in Punjab in 1978 but divided between an Indian
faction and a British one); the Babbar Khalsa (also founded in Punjab in 1978 and divided
between a  national  and an international  branch with little  intercommunication);  the
International  Sikh  Youth  Federation  (ISYF,  founded  in  1984)  and  the  World  Sikh
Organization (WSO, founded in New York in 1984 and soon operating from the US, Canada
and, to a lesser extent, the UK). 
28 Whether in the UK or in North America, the movement for Khalistan has always been a
fragmented collection of self-styled leaders and opposite factions. Dominated numerically
and politically by Jat militants (Gayer 2000), the Khalistan movement has suffered from
the main feature of Jat political culture: the fragility of hierarchical ties and, hence, of
factional affiliations. Among the Jats, as shown by anthropologist Joyce Pettigrew (1985),
alliance to a faction prevails above obedience to a leader, and even the association with a
certain faction is a matter subject to swift changes.  Whether in the Punjab or in the
diaspora,  militants committed to the Khalistan movement on a highly subjective and
often temporary basis, out of personal convictions or emotions rather than in a sign of
devotion to the cause of Sikh sovereignty or in allegiance to a particular leader.
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29 If the symbolic and physical violence of the Indian state has contributed to the formation
of  a  ‘Sikh diaspora’  (Axel  2001),  Khalistani  ethnic entrepreneurs  have reinforced the
internal  cleavages  of  the  global  panth,  which  existed  long  before  the  Indian  army
launched its assault on the Golden Temple but which came back with a vengeance in the
years following these critical events. Indeed, the events of 1984 initiated a moment of
solidarity which contributed to the transcendence of  caste affiliations.  However,  this
moment of unity was short-lived and the hegemonic position of the Jats in the movement
for  Khalistan  kept  other  castes  at  bay.  In  Britain,  this  was  particularly  true  of  the
Ramgarhias,  whose  specific  identity  was  reinforced  by  their  ‘twice  migrants’  status
(Bhachu 1985). Most of them had relocated in the UK after their expulsion from East
Africa. And since their arrival, they had organized separately from the Jats, building their
own temples and forming their own associations. Although Ravidasi ‘untouchables’ did
not  share  this  migratory trajectory,  they  also  remained  outside  the  movement  for
Khalistan and organized on their own terms,  around their own religious institutions,
known as deras. 
30 Far from being consensual,  Khalistani  attempts at  building a Sikh diaspora around a
nationalist agenda have thus met with a mitigated success and they ended up reinforcing
the pluralism of overseas Sikh ‘communities’. On a larger scale, it seems to me that South
Asian communities settled in the UK have been going through a process of implosion
which could be compared to the opening of a Russian nesting doll. The Indian diaspora,
for  instance,  has given birth to antagonistic  religious diasporas which,  in turn,  have
imploded along caste lines. However, as Gerd Baumann (1998: 115) suggests, ‘this process
is not one of simple segmentary fission, of a ‘majority community’ falling apart. Rather, it
increases the institutional repertoire while leaving intact the multiplicity of cross-cutting
cleavages’. Moreover, as I have already suggested, attempts have been made at rebuilding
the stacking doll. Since the return of the Punjab to normalcy, in the second half of the
1990s,  some overseas  promoters  of Khalistan  have  reinvented  themselves  as  Punjabi
nationalists, trying to bridge the gaps between Punjabis of all caste and creed. On a supra-
national basis, South Asian youths from the upper classes have also tried to promote a
pan-Asian ethnicity transcending linguistic and religious boundaries. Rather than being
led by one structural trend, these processes of identity formation remain contested and
contradictory, in a permanent dialectics of fission and fusion but also in a continuous




31 Looking at the relations between South Asian communities in a circumscribed area, such
as West London, tells us a lot on the structural weaknesses of diasporas. The internal and
external  boundaries  of  these  translocal  ethnic  groups  are  constantly  questioned and
challenged, often in opposite directions. Ethnic entrepreneurs challenging the dominant
forms of identity politics which sustain the diaspora may be inward looking, emphasizing
internal cleavages of the group to divide it or to ‘cleanse’ it from unorthodox elements.
These challengers may also be outward looking, trying to bridge the gaps with other
diasporic ‘communities’. ‘Diaspora is where constructed nationalisms come into contact’
(Shukla 2005: 13) and the dialectics of fission and fusion is at work in every segment of
Indian and Pakistani diasporic formations, as well as in their contact zones. It fashions
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the relations between and within these diasporas. It takes specific forms in each political
locality,  according  to  local  equations  of  power  and  to  the  response  of  local  state
authorities. Thus, if an Indian, a Pakistani or even an Indo-Pakistani diaspora does exist,
it is not as a stable and unitary ‘transnational community’ but rather as a plural society
with flexible internal and external boundaries. 
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NOTES
1. For a notable exception to this rule, see Bates (2001).
2. On trans-local fieldwork, see Ulf Hannerz (2003: 21).
3. For a notable exception, see Werbner (2002).
4. Interview with Veena Verma, Southall, 19/07/1999.
5. John McDonnell, of Irish origin, became the M.P. for Hayes and Harlington in 1997.
6. On the ‘masala culture’ of South Asians settled in the US, see Mohammad-Arif (2000).
7. In 1997, 10,5 % of the youths were unemployed in the Chalvey borough of Slough, cradle of the
dreaded Chalvey Boys. In the Ealing borough where Southall is located, this rate was even higher,
approaching 40 %. In Southall itself, 32 % of the ‘Pakistani’ males and 16 % of the ‘Indians’ were
unemployed at the beginning of the 1990s (Malik 1997, Baumann 1998: 51).
8. Several incidents of vandalism did affect the 1996 World Cup in India, though. This was the
case, in particular, during the match between India and Sri-Lanka which took place in Calcutta's
Eden Gardens.  But  in  the  weeks  which  followed the  incident,  30  000  Indians  sent  letters  of
apologies for the turmoil to the Sri-Lankan government (Nandy 2000: xvii).
9. On the relation between fun, violence and nationalism, see Verkaaik (2004).
10. According to the 1991 Census, 74 % of ‘Pakistani’ women and 87 % of ‘Indian’ women living in
Southall were employed (Baumann 1998: 52).
11. On Indo-Pakistani ‘cricket diplomacy’, see Gayer forthcoming.
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ABSTRACTS
The construction of an ‘other’ and the confrontation with this intimate enemy lies at the heart of
identity politics. In diasporic environments, these constructions of the ‘other’ have two major
attributes:  their  multiplicity  and their  volatility.  Ethnic  entrepreneurs  have  a  wide  range  of
options to propose an ‘enemy’ to their audience, hence their multiplicity. At the same time, social
and political evolutions in the migrants’ country of residence or in their home state make such
politics of otherness highly contingent. The study of ethnic relations in diasporic environments
is thus a difficult task and very little empirical material is presently available on this critical
issue. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap, through an exploration of patterns of conflict and
cooperation amongst South Asian residents of Southall, in West London.
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